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AOTEAROA - NEW ZEALAND
“Race relations” and the place of the Treaty of Waitangi as a blueprint 
for nation building were very much at the forefront of the national 
political agenda in 2004. The broad political consensus shared by both 
National and Labour-led governments in New Zealand over the past 
decade collapsed in the wake of the soaring political popularity of Don 
Brash, the new leader of the National Party, the main opposition po-
litical party in the New Zealand Parliament.
The legitimacy of policy initiatives and programmes that specifi-
cally target Mãori in order to reduce the relative socio-economic dis-
parities that exist between indigenous communities and other New 
Zealanders, and the role of the Treaty of Waitangi in managing con-
temporary relationships between indigenous communities and the 
Crown, have come under sustained attack.
The Treaty of Waitangi under threat
The underlying theme of Brash’s widely reported speech to the Orewa 
Rotary Club in January 2004 was the apparent “threat” that the Treaty 
of Waitangi settlement process represented for the future of the coun-
try. Throughout the speech he repeatedly emphasised what he claimed 
was “a dangerous drift to racial separatism” which undermined “the 
essential notion of one rule for all in a single nation state”. In a move 
clearly designed to tap into public resentment, Brash argued that the 
Treaty of Waitangi was an archaic relic of the past, and on that basis 
should possess no more than a symbolic role in New Zealand society. 
In rejecting notions of the Crown’s “partnership” with iwi, hapu and 
urban Mãori communities, Brash has clearly signified that a return to 
-
229NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA AND THE ISLANDS OF THE PACIFIC
more traditional constitutional concerns is on the cards should the Na-
tional Party be in a position to form a government at the next election:
We intend to remove divisive race-based features from legislation. The 
“principles of the Treaty” – never clearly defined yet ever expanding – are 
the thin end of a wedge leading to a racially divided state and we want no 
part of that. There can be no basis for special privileges for any race, no 
basis for government funding based on race, no basis for introducing Maori 
wards in local authority elections, and no obligation for local governments 
to consult Maori in preference to other New Zealanders. We will remove 
the anachronism of the Maori seats in Parliament. … Having done all that, 
we really will be one people – as Hobson declared us to be in 1840.1 
Stung by the strong public support for Brash in recent opinion polls, 
the Labour-led government announced a series of abrupt U-turns, 
1.   Taitokerau 
2. Tainui 
3.  Arawa
4. Mataatua
5. Taira Whiti
6. Takitimu
7. Te Upoko O Te Ika
8. Manawatu
9. Whanganui
10. Taranaki
11. Te Tau Ihu
Regional iwi groupings. 
Source: www.takoa.co.nz
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hoping to placate the concerns of the wider electorate. In a concession 
to the publicity generated by Don Brash, Prime Minister Helen Clark is 
reported as saying that the government may have moved ahead of 
public opinion on Treaty issues. This follows the appointment of State 
Services Minister, Trevor Mallard, to a new role as “Co-ordinating 
Minister of Race Relations” to undertake a comprehensive review of 
policy initiatives and programmes that specifically target Mãori, and 
an examination of legislative references to the principles of the Treaty 
of Waitangi. This has occurred amidst calls for an inquiry into consti-
tutional arrangements, including the place of the Treaty of Waitangi.
References to the Treaty of Waitangi in state legislation represent a 
significant concession after years of concerted struggle by Mãori to 
combat the racism that has underpinned New Zealand society and the 
discriminatory practices of state institutions. The ideological battle 
against the specific programmes and initiatives that target Mãori com-
munities as a symbol of this victory has been raging ever since – as 
opponents claim the mantle of the anti-racist movement in their battle 
against “reverse racism” towards Pãkehã. Far from a “level playing 
field”, as opponents of affirmative action claim, racism is a pervasive 
force in New Zealand society. Programmes that consciously address 
this racism are absolutely critical.
The impact of Brash’s Orewa speech, however, has been to make 
the expression of the bigoted and racist ideas of some New Zealanders 
publicly respectable. Brash has provided them with a more acceptable 
political figure to hide behind, while the attacks on Mãori, implicit in 
his public pronouncements, represent a tacit coded appeal to cruder 
racist attitudes. It is not simply coincidental that the fascist organiza-
tion, the National Front, is seeking registration as a political party for 
next year’s elections on the basis that the “public mood is right for its 
militarist and anti-immigrant stance”.2 
Foreshore and seabed
On 18 November 2004, one of the most contentious and draconian 
pieces of state legislation was passed by 66 votes to 53 in the New Zea-
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land parliament. The Foreshore and Seabed Act was largely a response to 
the controversy that erupted over a Court of Appeal decision in June 
2003 that challenged the Crown’s long-held assertion that it owned the 
foreshore and seabed. The Court found that Mãori may have custom-
ary interests in the foreshore, which could lead to the granting of pri-
vate title by the Mãori Land Court.
Against a background of growing public hysteria, fuelled in part by 
cynical political opportunism and sensationalised media reports that 
Mãori would block off public access to the beaches, the government 
released its initial plans for the foreshore and seabed in December 
2003. The policy entailed introducing new legislation that would ef-
fectively extinguish Mãori customary rights in the coastal marine area. 
The government then embarked on a process of “consultation”. De-
spite the fact that Mãori overwhelmingly rejected the government’s 
proposals, the government did not alter its proposed approach.
In January 2004, the Waitangi Tribunal’s Report on the Crown’s 
Seabed and Foreshore Policy condemned the government’s policy as 
being in substantial breach of the Treaty of Waitangi:
The policy clearly breaches the Treaty of Waitangi. But beyond the Treaty, the 
policy fails in terms of the wider norms of domestic and international law 
that underpin good government in a modern democratic state. These include 
the rule of law, and principles of fairness and non-discrimination. 3
Protest and the formation of the Mãori Party
The lack of accountability and democracy in the negotiations over the 
foreshore and seabed legislation generated intense anger and resent-
ment. On 5 May 2004, a protest hikoi (a walk or march) arrived in Wel-
lington with up to 20,000 people who strongly opposed the govern-
ment’s plans. The hikoi, the largest protest since the land rights move-
ment of the 1970s, had set off from the Far North of New Zealand’s 
North Island thirteen days earlier, picking up thousands of supporters 
as it marched towards the nation’s capital. The government’s Mãori 
MPs came in for heavy flak and many speakers reignited the call for a 
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Mãori party to be established, saying it was the only vehicle for Mãori 
political aspirations. The Prime Minister, Helen Clark, tried to margin-
alise the hikoi, describing the marchers as “haters and wreckers”.
The government’s proposals on ownership of the foreshore and 
seabed also exposed bitter internal divisions amongst the Mãori mem-
bers of the governing Labour Party itself. The Associate Maori Affairs 
Minister, Tariana Turia, announced her resignation from Parliament 
and the Labour Party over the issue. With growing dissatisfaction with 
the Labour government among Mãori voters, Turia was critical in es-
tablishing a new Mãori party to contest the next general parliamentary 
elections. As co-leader of the Mãori party, Turia subsequently re-won 
her Te Tai Hauauru constituency (a Mãori constituency stretching from 
Putaruru and Tokoroa in the north to Porirua in the south) in a by-elec-
tion in July 2004, winning around 90 per cent of the votes cast.
Despite this, the Foreshore and Seabed Act will come into effect on 
17 January 2005 and vests all parts of the foreshore and seabed not cur-
rently “subject to a specified freehold interest” in the Crown “as its 
absolute property”. The Act has radically changed the legal situation 
in New Zealand in relation to Mãori customary rights and customary 
ownership of land characterised as foreshore and seabed. It prevents 
Mãori from access to judicial recourse by removing existing legal routes 
for Mãori to have their customary rights and ownership in the foreshore 
and seabed investigated and legally recognised. The government is ac-
tively disregarding the customary rights that were guaranteed under 
the Treaty of Waitangi and which are also recognised in international 
law. In this way, the legislation represents an unparalleled attack on the 
rights of iwi, hapu and urban Mãori communities.                               
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